CN — LARRY ROMANOFF: 民主,最危险的宗教 —  第15部分——中国不是西方

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    Democracy, The Most Dangerous Religion

    民主最危险的宗教

     

    Part 15 – China is Not the West

    第15部分——中国不是西方

     

    By Larry Romanoff, December 21, 2022

    拉里·罗曼诺夫著,2022年12月21日

    译者:珍珠

    CHINESE   ENGLISH

    China is different in having a one-party government, which Americans consider a religious heresy, but the system has enormous advantages. Here, there is no forced separation of officials on the basis of political ideology. China’s entire social spectrum is represented in government in the same way as in Chinese or any other society. There is no partisan in-fighting. Unlike the West, China’s system looks for consensus rather than conflict. Government decision-making is not a sport where my team has to win. It is simply a group of people with various viewpoints working together to obtain a consensus for policy and action for the overall good of their nation. China’s one-party system is superior in virtually all respects to what we have in the West, and how can it be otherwise when the nation’s government officials don’t waste their time fighting juvenile ideological battles with opposition parties.

     中国的一党政府不同,美国人认为它是一种宗教异端,但这种体制有巨大的优势。这里不存在基于政治意识形态的官员被迫分离。中国的整个社会阶层在政府中的代表性与在中国或其他任何社会中的代表性是一样的。战斗中没有党派之争。与西方不同,中国的体制寻求共识而不是冲突。政府决策不是我的团队必胜的运动。它只是一群观点各异的人为了国家的整体利益而共同努力,就政策和行动达成共识。中国的一党制几乎在所有方面都优于西方的一党制,如果中国政府官员不浪费时间与反对党打年轻人的意识形态斗争,情况又怎么会如此呢。

    One of the greatest deciding factors permitting China’s rise is the lack of a belligerent political environment due to the absence of multi-party politics. China’s one-party government is in for the long term; it makes no short-term decisions for the sake of political expediency. China makes decisions for the good of the whole country and, having made them, implements them. There is no partisanship, there are no lobbyists or special interest groups with the power to skew important decisions and rob the population of what it might have had. The benefits of this system can be seen in its results. China has already far surpassed the undeveloped nations that adopted Western democratic governments, and likely has a brighter future than most of them. Why is the West so eager for China to abandon a centuries-old system that clearly works well, in favor of one designed for ideological battles, conflicts and shouting wars?

     允许中国崛起的最大决定因素之一是,由于缺乏多党政治,缺乏好战的政治环境。中国的一党政府将长期执政;它不会为了政治权宜之计而做出短期决定。中国做决定是为了整个国家的利益,而且在做了决定之后,就会执行这些决定。没有党派之争,也没有说客或特殊利益集团有权扭曲重要决策,剥夺民众可能拥有的东西。这种制度的好处可以从其结果中看到。中国已经远远超过了采用西方民主政府的不发达国家,而且可能比大多数国家有更光明的未来。西方为什么如此渴望中国放弃一个显然运行良好的有几百年历史的体系,转而支持一个专为意识形态斗争、冲突和呐喊战争设计的体系?

    China’s one-party system is the only thing saving it from destruction, and China needs to stop apologising for it. It is precisely due to China’s so-called “authoritarian” system that only the smartest and most competent can get into leadership positions. It is due only to China’s one-party system that 800 million people have been lifted out of poverty and that China’s GDP has increased by 1700%, a feat never achieved in history by any so-called democracy. And while I don’t want to be unkind, if you’re Chinese, how do you imagine that your “democratic participation” would have improved the above results? My advice is to be grateful for what you have, because you really don’t know how lucky you are.

     中国的一党制是唯一能让它免于毁灭的制度,中国需要停止为它道歉。正是由于中国的所谓“威权”制度,只有最聪明、最有能力的人才能担任领导职务。正是由于中国的一党制,8亿人摆脱了贫困,中国的GDP增长了1700%,这是历史上任何所谓的民主都从未实现过的壮举。虽然我不想表现得不友善,但如果你是中国人,你认为你的“民主参与”会如何改善上述结果呢?我的建议是感激你所拥有的东西,因为你真的不知道自己有多幸运。

    China’s government leaders manage by consensus, not by power, authority or bullying. It is their job to create agreement and unified willing participation in the country’s policies to meet its goals. At this level there are no children, and there is no one person with the power to start a war just because he doesn’t like someone, or who is free to alienate other nations on the basis of some blind personal ideology. In China, many people and industries are permitted to present their case, but private or short-term interests will not emerge victorious in this system. Your proposals will receive support and will succeed only if they are to the long-term benefit of the country as a whole – the greatest good for the nation and for the population. In the US system, corporations control the government; in China’s, the government controls the corporations. And those firms may often not get their way even if they are government-owned. On the introduction of HSR (High-Speed Rail) in China, some Chinese airlines (especially the state-owned ones) complained like hell, and with good reason, because many had to dramatically scale back their flight schedules since many people prefer the train. But the wide HSR network was seen as being in the best interests of the entire country and it went ahead. That is also why China has by far the best, and the least expensive, mobile phone system in the world.

     中国政府领导人的管理方式是共识,而不是权力、权威或欺凌。他们的工作是达成一致意见,统一自愿地参与该国的政策,以实现其目标。在这个层面上没有孩子,也没有一个人有权仅仅因为不喜欢某个人就发动战争,或者因为某个人盲目的个人意识形态就可以自由地疏远其他国家。在中国,许多人和行业都被允许陈述自己的观点,但私人或短期利益不会在这个体系中胜出。你的提议将得到支持,只有在符合整个国家的长期利益——对国家和人民的最大利益——的情况下才会成功。在美国体制下,企业控制着政府;在中国,政府控制着这些公司。即使是国有企业,这些公司也往往无法如愿以偿。关于高铁在中国的引入,一些中国航空公司(尤其是国有航空公司)抱怨不已,理由很充分,因为很多人更喜欢高铁,所以他们不得不大幅缩短航班时间。但广袤的高铁网络被视为符合整个国家的最佳利益,并得以推进。这也是中国迄今为止拥有世界上最好、最便宜的移动电话系统的原因。

    One American was trying to convince some of my Chinese friends of the great benefits of the uninformed selecting the incompetent, claiming that American-style democracy “gives you more choices”. Choices of what? He was equating the task of selecting the senior management of one of the largest and most important countries in the world, with buying shampoo in the supermarket. “I can give you more choices.” The many senior officials of China’s government are the only people who truly and completely understand the challenges China faces, both from within and from without, and who know the kind and quality of people needed to guide the nation. They are the only people who are competent to evaluate and judge those who are best suited to lead China through the next decades. Nobody outside of those central departments knows how to identify and select those who are capable of leading and protecting China. China today has leaders with a competence unmatched anywhere in the world, men and women who have devoted their lives to the difficult magic of making China a first-world country in only one or two generations, bringing this wonderful country to the international prominence it once had and will have again. And too many Americans, including all of the US government, would like very much to prevent this from happening because it is a challenge to their worldwide domination.

     一个美国人试图说服我的一些中国朋友,让他们相信无知者选择无能者的巨大好处,声称美国式的民主“给了你更多选择”。选择什么?他把挑选世界上最大、最重要的国家之一的高级管理人员的任务与在超市购买洗发水相提并论。“我可以给你更多选择。”中国政府的许多高级官员是唯一真正、完全了解中国所面临的挑战的人,无论是从内部还是外部,他们都知道领导国家所需要的人的种类和素质。他们是唯一有能力评估和评判最适合领导中国走过未来几十年的人。这些中央部门以外的人都不知道如何识别和挑选有能力领导和保护中国的人。今天的中国有着世界上任何地方都无法匹敌的领导人,他们毕生致力于用一两代人的时间让中国成为第一世界国家这一艰巨的魔法,把这个美好的国家带到了曾经和将来的国际地位。包括美国政府全体在内的太多美国人都非常希望阻止这种情况发生,因为这是对他们在世界范围内主导地位的挑战。

    In October of 2013, Qiushi published one of the most excellent and intelligent articles I have ever read on the subject of democracy and multi-party politics. I do not know the name of the author, but he is a professor at Fudan University in Shanghai, in the School of International Relations and Public Affairs. He wrote that:

     2013年10月,求是发表了我读过的关于民主和多党政治的最优秀、最聪明的文章之一。我不知道作者的名字,但他是上海复旦大学国际关系与公共事务学院的教授。他写道:

    The ‘benchmark for appraising democracy is determined entirely by a small handful of countries who had “a contingent of campaigners paid by various foundations to go around the world delivering speeches and selling the case for democracy. Thus, democracy, together with the social sciences founded on its basis, is more like a propaganda tool employed by the West than anything else, and the resulting knowledge bubble is far from small. Under the Western-style appraisal mechanisms of democracy, there is only one precondition that needs to be met for a developing country to be considered a “democracy”, or to “graduate” from the class of authoritarian countries: that country must show obedience to Western countries, and must give up its independent foreign and domestic policies. Any country that does so is immediately rewarded with “international” praise”.

     评估民主的基准”完全由少数几个曾经“一支由各种基金会资助的活动人士队伍在世界各地发表演讲,推销民主的主张。因此,民主和建立在民主基础上的社会科学,更像是西方使用的宣传工具,由此产生的知识泡沫远远不小。在西方式的民主评价机制下只有一个先决条件需要满足,发展中国家才能被视为“民主国家”,或从威权国家的阶级中“毕业”:该国必须服从西方国家,必须放弃独立的外交和国内政策。任何这样做的国家都会立即得到“国际”的赞扬。

    He also cautioned Chinese, as I strongly do myself, to stop apologising for China’s system of government because it is in fact one of the best in the world. And the Americans don’t have to like it.

     他还警告中国人,就像我自己强烈建议的那样,不要再为中国的政府体制道歉了,因为它实际上是世界上最好的体制之一。美国人也不必喜欢它。

    The Americans fill their media with articles on China’s government system, often posing disingenuous but supposedly-thoughtful questions like “What will democracy add to China’s efficiency?” This is clever propaganda since the question stakes out in advance the position that a multi-party system is naturally superior and more efficient, thereby framing our discussion and limiting it to a useless opinion-based debate. The simple truth, available to anyone who looks, is that China’s one-party system is almost infinitely more efficient and responsive than any Western model, and even a partial attempt to emulate the Western system, especially the American one, would automatically restrict further progress in China, and would likely work to eliminate the gains already made. To my mind, the most serious mistake the Chinese people can make is to attribute even a shred of credibility to claims of superiority or benefit in a multi-party political system. Rather than feelings of inferiority, the Chinese should be taking pride in their country’s political framework and stop apologising for its grand success.

     美国人在媒体上发表关于中国政府体制的文章,经常提出一些不真诚但理应深思熟虑的问题,比如“民主会给中国的效率带来什么?”这是一种巧妙的宣传,因为这个问题预先表明了多党制度天生优越、效率更高的立场,从而形成了我们的讨论框架,并将其局限于一场毫无意义的基于观点的辩论。任何人都能看到一个简单的事实,那就是中国的一党制几乎比任何西方模式都要高效、反应迅速得多,即使只是部分模仿西方体制,尤其是美国体制,也会自动限制中国的进一步进步,并可能会消除已经取得的成果。在我看来,中国人民可能犯的最严重的错误是,把哪怕是一点点信誉都归咎于在多党政治体制中声称优越或利益的说法。中国人不应该自卑,而应该为自己国家的政治框架感到自豪,停止为自己的巨大成功道歉。

    Again, we need only look at the results to realise the truth of this. No nation in the history of the world has achieved China’s stunning level of progress and development, the credit for which goes in large part to China’s government system and its selection and training of leaders. It’s true the system must adapt to eliminate flaws but the basic framework is unassailable. It isn’t China that shut down half its government for lack of funding. It isn’t China where 30% of the population lost their homes to a fraudulent scheme by its bankers. It isn’t China where millions of educated jobless and homeless are sleeping in tent cities or  in the sewers under Las Vegas, and where fully 25% of the people are living below the poverty line and dependent on government assistance for food. It isn’t China where 70% of parents believe their childrens’ lives will be worse than their own, nor is it China where the people have lost all hope for a better future. These distressing conditions, and many more, are all in America and credit for them must be given entirely to the corrupt and dysfunctional multi-party democratic system that Americans have been taught to venerate while it bleeds them dry.

     同样地,我们只需看看结果就能明白这一点的真相。世界历史上没有哪个国家能达到中国惊人的进步和发展水平,这在很大程度上要归功于中国的政府体制及其领导人的选拔和培训。的确,这个体系必须进行调整以消除缺陷,但其基本框架是无懈可击的。并不是中国因为缺乏资金而关闭了一半的政府。在中国,30%的人口不是因为银行家的欺诈计划而失去家园的。中国不是数百万受过教育的失业者和无家可归者睡在帐篷城市或拉斯维加斯地下的下水道里的地方,也不是完全有25%的人生活在贫困线以下,依靠政府援助获得食物的地方。这不是70%的家长认为孩子的生活会比自己糟糕的中国,也不是人们对美好未来完全失去希望的中国。这些令人痛苦的情况,以及更多的情况,都存在于美国,必须完全归功于腐败、运转不良的多党民主制度。人们一直在教育美国人,要尊重这种制度,而它会让他们流血而死。

    Many foreign observers are now (finally) admitting openly that China’s form of government exhibits multiple signs of superiority over Western systems, and that it is largely responsible for China’s efficiency, for its rapid development, and for its speed of response in areas like the Sichuan earthquake and the planning and deployment of its high-speed train system. The West could learn a lot from China’s government system. It works, beautifully. It has transformed the economy, brought hundreds of millions out of poverty and caused incomes to triple or more in the past ten years alone. It has put men into space, built the world’s fastest trains, the longest undersea tunnels, the world’s longest bridges, the largest dams. It has produced a growth rate of over 10% per year for 30 years, compared to perhaps 3% in the West. Americans love to disparage China’s government as authoritarian, but this “authoritarian” government has almost entirely eliminated illiteracy, liberated Chinese women and extended life expectancy for all from 41 years in 1950 to 76 and still rising today. It has created an educational system that has few apologies to make, and its social welfare system will soon be the envy of many nations. It is rapidly creating the world’s largest genuine middle class. And it’s hardly begun.

     许多外国观察人士现在(终于)公开承认,中国的政府形式显示出比西方体制优越的多个迹象,中国的效率、快速发展、在四川地震等地区的反应速度,以及高铁系统的规划和部署,在很大程度上都要对其负责。西方可以从中国的政府体系中学到很多东西。它运行得很好。仅在过去十年里,它就改变了经济,让数亿人脱贫,使收入增加了三倍甚至更多。它将人类送入太空,建造了世界上最快的火车、最长的海底隧道、世界上最长的桥梁、最大的水坝。30年来,中国的年增长率超过10%,而西方国家的年增长率可能只有3%。美国人喜欢贬低中国政府的威权主义,但这个“威权主义”政府几乎完全消除了文盲,解放了中国女性,并将所有人的预期寿命从1950年的41岁延长到76岁,直到今天仍在增长。它建立了一个几乎不需要道歉的教育体系,它的社会福利体系很快就会成为许多国家羡慕的对象。它正在迅速形成世界上最大的真正中产阶级。而且它几乎还没有开始。

    The Chinese are not Interested in “Politics”

    中国人对“政治”不感兴趣

    In any Western country, political discussions often become emotionally-heated rather quickly, since most everyone has an opinion and many hold those opinions very strongly. The only surprise is that the violent emotions don’t lead more often to physical violence. However, since China hasn’t politics but only government, the discussions are normally muted. Not everyone has an opinion, few of those opinions inspire emotion, and debates are most often rational. Moreover, these debates seldom occur, since few people in any population are sufficiently knowledgeable to intelligently discuss the operations of a national government. And even fewer are interested, unless the government appears to be functioning badly. Most people in China will freely confess that they lack the knowledge of government, primarily because it is outside their field of study and employment, and they have no illusions about their ability to affect their national or local governments in a positive way. They “participate” only if something actually goes wrong. And, sometimes things, at least at the local level, do go wrong, and then the “participation” is quite loud. And, in each such case, if the local authorities fail to act quickly, the national government will step in and force a rectification. In China, “mistakes” by a government are seldom allowed to persist, and they often have prison sentences attached to them.

     在任何一个西方国家,政治讨论往往会很快在情绪上变得激烈起来,因为大多数人都有自己的观点,而且很多人都非常坚定地持有这些观点。唯一让人惊讶的是,暴力情绪并没有更多地导致身体暴力。然而,由于中国没有政治,只有政府,讨论通常是沉默的。并不是每个人都有自己的观点,这些观点很少能激发情感,辩论往往是理性的。此外,这些辩论很少发生,因为在所有人口中,几乎没有人有足够的知识来明智地讨论一个国家政府的运作。对此感兴趣的人就更少了,除非政府似乎运转不良。大多数中国人会坦承自己缺乏政府知识,主要是因为政府不在自己的学习和就业领域之内,他们对自己以积极的方式影响国家或地方政府的能力没有幻想。只有在出现实际问题时,他们才会“参与”。而且,有时候事情的确出了问题,至少在地方层面是这样,然后“参与”的声音就相当大了。而且,在每一种情况下,如果地方当局不能迅速采取行动,国家政府将介入并强制整改。在中国,政府的“错误”很少被允许继续存在,而且往往会被判入狱。

    It is always a shock to Westerners, especially Americans, that some countries don’t permit ‘the people’ to meddle in government unless they have serious credentials and know what they’re doing. In a recent NYT article, it was reflected that Chinese typically believe that peasants (small-town Americans) “are too unschooled to intelligently select the nation’s leaders“. I don’t see how we can avoid the conclusion that they have it right.

     一些国家不允许“人民”干预政府,除非他们有严肃的资历,知道自己在做什么,这总是让西方人,尤其是美国人感到震惊。《纽约时报》最近的一篇文章反映出,中国人通常认为农民(小城镇美国人)“没有受过教育,无法明智地选择国家领导人”。我看不出我们怎么能避免得出他们说得对的结论。

    Few educated Chinese see the Western multi-party democratic model as particularly appealing because they don’t equate politics with government – as Westerners do – nor do they see sanity in the selection of national leaders as a team sport. The Chinese see the West as having a system where anyone, even a person with no education, training, knowledge, experience, ability – or even intelligence – can rise to become the President or Prime Minister, and where high government office requires no credentials other than popularity. They look on this with an interesting mixture of disbelief and disdain. They are also aware that a multi-party system requires the forcible division of a society into ideologically different groups with violently opposing interests. China has made no such social divisions, and the culture would mitigate against them since they would of necessity lead to conflict and biased ideological agendas, disregarding the good of the country as a whole. Divisions of this kind are anathema to the Chinese, as they should be to us Westerners. As I’ve noted elsewhere, the number of Chinese citizens interested in the US-style of multi-party democracy is about the same as the number of Americans interested in communism.

     很少有受过教育的中国人认为西方的多党民主模式特别有吸引力,因为他们不像西方人那样把政治等同于政府,也不认为挑选国家领导人是一项团队运动是明智之举。中国人认为西方有这样一种体制,任何人,即使是没有受过教育、培训、没有知识、经验、没有能力甚至没有智力的人,都可以升任总统或总理,而且担任政府要职只需要受欢迎就可以了。他们带着一种有趣的怀疑和鄙视的混合态度看待这件事。他们还意识到,多党制要求将一个社会强行划分为意识形态不同的群体,这些群体有着激烈对立的利益。中国没有这样的社会分歧,文化也会减轻这种分歧,因为它们必然会导致冲突和有偏见的意识形态议程,无视国家整体的利益。这种分歧对中国人来说是深恶痛绝的,对我们西方人来说也是如此。正如我在其他地方指出的那样,对美国式多党民主感兴趣的中国公民人数与对共产主义感兴趣的美国人人数大致相同。

    By contrast, Westerners often observe that the Chinese are apolitical or even apathetic, having no interest in politics. This is true, but it reflects a fundamental ignorance since China neither has nor wants “politics“, and treats government as “government“. The Chinese see government as an occupation, a career like any other. They do not view government through the chromatic and otherwise distorted political team-sport lens as Westerners do. Some people in every country may be attracted or tempted by the prospect of a powerful position in government or industry, but this tends to be a small minority. Most Chinese, as probably most people in every country, want stability and a chance to improve their lives. So long as the government is able to create an environment that offers hope and a stable platform for improvement, they have little interest in the functioning of the government and are happy to leave it to those who are in charge.

     相比之下,西方人经常观察到中国人对政治漠不关心甚至漠不关心,对政治没有兴趣。这是事实,但它反映了一种根本的无知,因为中国既没有也不想“政治”,把政府当作“政府”对待。中国人把政府视为一种职业,一种和其他职业一样的职业。他们不像西方人那样,用色彩斑斓或扭曲的政治团队运动视角看待政府。每个国家的一些人可能都会被在政府或行业中获得强大地位的前景所吸引或诱惑,但这往往是少数人。大多数中国人,可能和每个国家的大多数人一样,希望稳定和改善生活的机会。只要政府能够创造一个带来希望的环境和一个稳定的改善平台,他们就对政府的运作几乎不感兴趣,愿意把它留给负责人。

    Not Many Chinese are Interested in Government, Either

     也没有多少中国人对政府感兴趣

     

    The Chinese people have a much more mature and realistic attitude toward government than do people in the West, in that they look at government as government, not through the primitive psychological mask of party politics. And when they look at government, they do not delude themselves into believing that running a country is as simple as ordinary Western people think it is. They are aware that a government position necessarily means the assumption of great responsibility. They know it requires a high level of expertise to understand and deal with issues of social policy, population, international trade and finance, the national and international economy, the nation’s industrial policy, foreign policy, military matters, border disputes, friction with US imperialism, and dozens more major and serious topics. And, in the end, most Chinese don’t feel they have the knowledge or experience to affect the course of their country in any positive way – and of course they are correct. They recognise that their government officials have committed their lives to education and training, to acquire the knowledge and skills to manage and lead a country and a society, and they are justifiably aware of their own personal shortcomings. In China, a government career is a commitment requiring one’s full participation, but those not in the professional fields of national governance are not encouraged to do so because they are likely to be uninformed. We cannot argue that this is wrong, and it does seem a more intelligent and realistic way of thinking about government.

     中国人对政府的态度比西方人成熟得多、现实得多,因为他们把政府视为政府,而不是通过政党政治的原始心理面具。当他们审视政府时,他们不会自欺欺人地认为治理一个国家就像普通西方人认为的那样简单。他们知道,政府的立场必然意味着承担重大责任。他们知道,要理解和处理社会政策、人口、国际贸易和金融、国家和国际经济、国家产业政策、外交政策、军事事务、边境争端、与美帝国主义的摩擦等几十个重大而严肃的议题,需要高水平的专业知识。最后,大多数中国人觉得自己没有以任何积极的方式影响国家进程的知识或经验——他们当然是对的。他们认识到自己的政府官员毕生致力于教育和培训,获得管理和领导一个国家和社会的知识和技能,他们有理由意识到自己的个人缺点。在中国,从政是一项需要充分参与的承诺,但不鼓励那些不在国家治理专业领域的人这样做,因为他们可能不知情。我们不能说这是错误的,它的确似乎是一种更明智、更现实的政府思维方式。

    Foreign Resentment of China’s One-Party Government

     外国对中国一党政府的不满

     

    The reason the Americans and the European Jewish mafia hate China’s one-party system is not because it’s a bad system, but because it cannot be controlled by external forces. China’s one-party system is a perfect form of government, as is obvious by the results it has produced, but the Americans and the Jews cannot get their fingers into it. If China has no political parties and no public elections, how can I buy the candidates? And if I cannot buy the candidates, how can I control the government?

     美国人和欧洲犹太黑手党憎恨中国的一党制,不是因为它是一个糟糕的制度,而是因为它不能被外部势力控制。中国的一党制是一种完美的政府形式,其产生的结果显而易见,但美国人和犹太人无法参与其中。如果中国没有政党,没有公开选举,我怎么能收买候选人呢?如果我买不到候选人,我怎么能控制政府呢?

    These people are willing to spend huge sums of money to buy control of China’s government and then have the power to influence all its policies, to initiate legislation and to slowly take control of the government. But in China, I can do nothing. The selection of China’s leaders is done quietly, in private. I don’t even know how the system works, and if I don’t understand the system, I cannot manipulate it. That’s why the Americans scream so loudly about China needing more “transparency” in its leadership selection. Why should they care how China chooses its leaders? It’s none of their business. China doesn’t criticise the way Americans choose their leaders. The Americans propose their “transparency” in moral terms, as if China were committing a sin by not being more “open”, but the issue is that they need to understand how it works so they can try to figure out a way to manipulate it. The truth is that China’s one-party government is the main armor preventing the country from being destroyed by the Westerners one more time.

     这些人愿意花巨资购买对中国政府的控制权,然后有权影响中国的所有政策,启动立法,并慢慢控制政府。但在中国,我无能为力。中国领导人的挑选是秘密进行的,而且是秘密进行的。我甚至不知道这个制度是如何运作的,如果我不了解这个制度,我就无法操纵它。这就是为什么美国人如此大声地叫嚣中国在领导层的选择上需要更多的“透明度”。他们为什么要关心中国如何选择领导人呢?这不关他们的事。中国不会批评美国人选择领导人的方式。美国人在道德上提出了他们的“透明度”,就好像中国没有更加“开放”是在犯罪,但问题是他们需要理解它是如何运作的,以便设法找到操纵它的方法。事实是,中国的一党政府是防止这个国家再次被西方人摧毁的主要盔甲。

    The Americans, and their European banker puppet-masters, know perfectly well that China’s leaders understand their intent and will never cooperate, so the American propaganda machine turns to the Chinese people. “You need democracy. You need multi-party politics. You deserve to have ‘choices’, because selecting a President is the same as buying shampoo in a supermarket. You should be like us, with the ‘freedom’ to choose your shampoo. Trust us. Have a revolution and overthrow your government. That’s what God wants you to do.”

     美国人及其欧洲银行家傀儡主人非常清楚,中国领导人理解他们的意图,永远不会合作,所以美国的宣传机器转向了中国人民。“你需要民主。你需要多党政治。你应该有‘选择’,因为选择总统就像在超市买洗发水一样。你应该像我们一样,有‘自由’选择洗发水。相信我们。发动革命,推翻你的政府。这是上帝希望你做的。

    It should be noted here that the Americans, as a fundamental part of their incessant interference in China’s internal affairs, make great effort to cultivate attitudes in China that will foster and support the development of a Left-Right political division in Chinese society, because the natural conflict inherent in this ideological divide is a prerequisite for the kind of political change the Americans want to inflict on China. In fact, the Americans have gone so far as to conduct extensive studies on the regional social structures of China to determine where in the country they might find the highest concentrations of those who might be considered “conservative” or “Right-Wing”, and this is where they look for puppets and “democratic dissidents” they can use to provoke China’s national leaders. This is the source of Ai Weiwei, Chen Guangcheng, Liu Xiaobo, and many others. The Americans incite these people to provoke and provoke until the government has no choice but to act, then flood the international media with stories of China “cracking down” on “political dissidents”. It’s all a huge fraud, a kind of game the Americans love to play. But in reality, it is always possible in any country to find a few disaffected individuals who are weak-minded and incite them to provoke their governments, usually to their great personal detriment, but then these individuals are always expendable. Witness the little American darling Joshua Wong in Hong Kong, inspired by the American Consulate in HK to push his luck far past the limit and now spend perhaps 20 years in prison as a reward. But, as I said, these puppet-idiots are all expendable.

     应该指出的是,作为美国不断干涉中国内政的基本组成部分,美国在中国大力培养态度,培养和支持中国社会左右政治分化的发展,因为这种意识形态分歧所固有的自然冲突,是美国想要对中国进行何种政治变革的先决条件。事实上,美国人甚至对中国的地区社会结构进行了广泛的研究,以确定他们可能会在中国的哪些地方发现那些可能被认为是“保守派”或“右翼”的人最集中的地方,他们在这里寻找可以用来激怒中国国家领导人的傀儡和“民主异见人士”。这就是艾未未、陈光诚、刘晓波和其他许多人的来源。美国人煽动这些人不断挑衅,直到政府别无选择,只能采取行动,然后在国际媒体上充斥着中国“打压”“政治异见人士”的故事。这都是一个巨大的骗局,一种美国人喜欢玩的游戏。但在现实中,任何国家都有可能找到几个心怀不满的人,他们意志薄弱,煽动他们挑衅本国政府,通常会给他们的个人造成巨大损害,但这些人总是可以牺牲的。看看在香港的美国小宠儿黄之锋吧,他受到美国驻香港领事馆的启发,把自己的运气远远推到了极限之外,现在作为回报,他可能要在监狱里服刑20年。但正如我所说,这些傀儡白痴都是可以牺牲的。

    There is one saving grace that may protect China from this disease called “democracy”, a matter that seems to be entirely unknown in the West. Instead of adopting a new policy and hoping it works as intended, the government will conduct small trials in selected areas, perhaps sometimes for years, to learn the real-world effects on all segments of society, adjusting as they go, until they believe they have something that can work nationwide. It is only after such focused trials that new directions will be taken. It is my fervent hope they are doing this with the introduction of elections for local rural officials. Also, one portion of “democracy with Chinese characteristics” is that there are, and have been, many policy proposals where the Chinese leaders are uncertain of the range of the welcome such legislation might receive from the general population, or of the potential economic or other effects a particular new legislation. In the first case, prior to proposing any legislation, the government will form literally thousands of teams to circulate among the population nationwide to discuss the new proposed legislation and obtain a clear picture of the views and preferences of the people. And the government definitely does listen to the will of the people, taking great pains to explain the reasons for various proposals and to arrive at a solution compatible with the overall aims for the nation, but one that will have the support of the people. If this isn’t “democracy”, I don’t know what would be.

     有一种拯救恩典可以保护中国免受这种疾病的影响,那就是所谓的“民主”。在西方,这个问题似乎完全不为人所知。政府不会采取一项新政策,希望它能如期发挥作用,而是会在选定的领域进行小规模试验,有时可能会持续数年,以了解现实世界对社会各阶层的影响,并在不断调整中,直到他们相信自己的政策能在全国范围内发挥作用为止。只有在进行了这些重点试验之后,才会有新的方向。我热切地希望,随着地方农村官员选举的引入,他们正在这样做。此外,“具有中国特色的民主”的一个部分是,中国领导人不确定此类立法可能受到普通民众欢迎的范围,也不确定某项新立法可能带来的经济或其他影响。在第一种情况下,在提出任何立法之前,政府将组建数千个小组,在全国各地的民众中传阅,讨论新的立法提案,了解民众的观点和偏好。政府肯定会听取民意,煞费苦心地解释各种提议的理由,并找到一个符合国家总体目标、但会得到人民支持的解决方案。如果这不是“民主”,我不知道会是什么。

    In an interview published in the Huffington Post some years ago, Helmut Schmidt, German’s former Chancellor, had this to say about the multi-party electoral system (“democracy”) for China:[1]

     几年前,在《赫芬顿邮报》发表的一篇采访中,德国前总理赫尔穆特·施密特对中国的多党选举制度(简称“民主”)说了这样的话:

    “Democracy is not the end point of mankind. Democracy has a number of serious failures. For instance, you have to be elected every four years and you have to be re-elected after the next four years. So, you try to tell the people what they would like to hear. The multi-party system is not the crown of progress ” . . . I would not sell it to the Chinese. The British have sold it to the Indians and to the Pakistanis and the Dutch tried to sell it to the Indonesians. Democracy is not really working in India. I would not tell the Egyptians to introduce democracy; nor would I pitch it to the other Muslim countries like Malaysia, Iran and Pakistan. It is a Western invention. It was not invented by Confucius. It did not work in ancient Rome [nor in Athens], and then it had not functioned in any other country in the world. And whether you become a democracy or not remains to be seen. My feeling is that [China] will not become a democracy.”

     民主不是人类的终点。民主有很多严重的失败。比如,你必须每四年当选一次,然后在接下来的四年里再当选一次。所以,你试图告诉人民他们想听什么。多党制不是进步的皇冠。”。我不会把它卖给中国人。英国人把它卖给了印度人和巴基斯坦人,荷兰人则试图把它卖给印尼人。民主制度在印度并不奏效。我不会告诉埃及人引入民主;我也不会把它推销给马来西亚、伊朗和巴基斯坦等其他穆斯林国家。这是西方的发明。它不是孔子发明的。它在古罗马不起作用(在雅典也不起作用),然后它也没有在世界上任何其他国家发挥作用。你是否成为民主国家还有待观察。我的感觉是,中国不会成为民主国家。

    As I have noted elsewhere, the disparity between the quality of elected politicians in Western countries and the analogous officials in China’s government, especially at the national level in the Central Government, is a discrepancy so vast that comparisons are largely meaningless. Lee Kuan Yew, the founding father of Singapore, praised China’s President Xi Jinping as “a man of great breadth” and put him in “the Nelson Mandela class of persons”, saying “that man has iron in his soul”, and Xi has been widely praised (except in the US) as a man who “will become the first truly global leader”. These are not compliments we see being paid to Western politicians. Why would China want to change?

     正如我在其他地方指出的那样,西方国家民选政客的素质与中国政府类似官员的素质之间存在巨大差异,尤其是在中央政府的国家层面上,这种差异如此之大,以至于进行比较在很大程度上毫无意义。 这些都不是我们看到的对西方政客的赞美。中国为什么要改变呢?

    The Compradors

    买办

    Still, the American interference project is very active in China today, the US government spending (by its own admission) more than $300 million each year inside China, searching for and coaching ‘dissidents’ and ‘democracy activists’ as well as other yuppie compradors wanting to ‘restructure’ China’s government to permit more foreign control.

     尽管如此,美国的干预计划如今在中国非常活跃,美国政府每年在中国国内支出超过3亿美元(据其自己承认),用于寻找和辅导“异见人士”和“民主活动人士”,以及其他想要“重组”中国政府、允许更多外国控制的雅皮士买办。

    I have often discussed various topics related to government, politics, the West, with groups of people in China – mostly young professionals, all university graduates, and have been frequently surprised at the attitudes of some who have been strongly influenced by foreign sources. The attitudes expressed, and even the words and phrases used, were too similar, almost verbatim, appearing to have come from some American source that was listing all the advantages of US-style “democracy”. I heard many comments like “China needs two political parties”, or “The West is so rich because it has democracy and a superior education system.” And so many others, cut from the same cloth, all idealised and false American propaganda, baseless and uninformed, riddled with American moral superiority and battered with a list of China’s comparative failings.

     我经常与中国的一些人讨论与政府、政治、西方有关的各种话题——大多是年轻的专业人士,都是大学毕业生。我经常对一些受到外国消息来源强烈影响的人的态度感到惊讶。表达的态度,甚至使用的词汇和短语都太过相似,几乎一字不差,似乎来自某个美国来源,该来源列出了美国式“民主”的所有优势。我听到过很多这样的评论,比如“中国需要两个政党”,或者“西方之所以如此富裕,是因为它有民主和优越的教育体系”,还有很多其他的评论,都是一模一样的,都是美国的理想主义和虚假宣传,毫无根据和信息,充斥着美国的道德优越感,还被一系列中国的相对失败所折磨。

    But when I explained, for example, that the West was rich primarily due to colonialism, to extermination of populations and looting of resources, these people were speechless. None appeared to have any idea that the US was encircling China with propaganda, with military, trying to infiltrate and collapse both China’s government and economy. None understood that the form of China’s government made it closed to foreign interference, which was primarily the reason the US wants China to open up and adopt multiple political parties. Most people to whom I spoke were naive, innocent, and dangerously unaware of the political forces surrounding them. These people were spellbound as I outlined many of these issues; they simply had no idea.

     但当我解释西方之所以富裕主要是因为殖民主义、人口灭绝和资源掠夺时,这些人说不出话来。似乎没有人知道美国正在用宣传和军事包围中国,试图渗透和瓦解中国政府和经济。没有人明白,中国政府的形式使其不受外国干涉,这主要是美国希望中国开放和接纳多个政党的原因。与我交谈的大多数人都天真无邪,危险地不知道他们周围的政治力量。当我概述其中许多问题时,这些人被迷住了;他们完全不知道。

    I fully concur with James Petras’ observation that “These Chinese yuppies imitate the worst of Western consumerist life styles and their political outlooks are driven by these life styles and Westernized identities which preclude any sense of solidarity with their own working class.” Many of these people are now embedded in China’s economic or other systems and are in position to do real harm. Many of them, especially ‘dissidents’ or ‘activists’ are supported and financed by American NGOs, but in their ignorance, they perceive no threat. To the extent that these people gain influence, they distract and weaken China, just as their traitorous counterparts did 150 years ago by effectively being intermediaries for their own colonisers.” As Petras again pointed out, the entire last crop of these Chinese collaborators were totally discredited before the Chinese people, and the same needs to happen again today.

     我完全同意詹姆斯·彼得拉斯的观点,即“这些中国雅皮士模仿了西方最糟糕的消费主义生活方式,他们的政治观是由这些生活方式和西方化身份所驱动的,这些身份排除了与自己的工人阶级的任何团结感”。这些人中的许多人现在已经融入了中国的经济体系或其他体系,有可能造成真正的伤害。他们中的许多人,尤其是“异见人士”或“活动人士”,得到了美国非政府组织的支持和资助,但由于无知,他们认为没有威胁。在一定程度上,这些人获得了影响力,他们分散了中国的注意力,削弱了中国的力量,就像150年前那些叛国者那样,他们实际上是自己殖民者的中间人。“正如彼得拉斯再次指出的那样,这些中国合作者的最后一批人在中国人民面前完全丧失了信誉,今天也需要这样做。

    President Xi has warned of the necessity to eradicate “subversive currents coursing through Chinese society”, as well as the dangers of American-financed NGOs in China, quoting a government document stating that “Western forces hostile to China and dissidents within the country are still constantly infiltrating the ideological sphere” and have “stirred up trouble” in many sensitive areas. I couldn’t agree more.

     习近平主席警告说,有必要消除“中国社会的颠覆潮流”,以及美国资助的非政府组织在中国的危险性。他援引一份政府文件的话说,“敌视中国的西方势力和中国国内的异见人士仍在不断渗透意识形态领域”,并在许多敏感领域“挑起事端”。我完全同意。

    *

    Mr. Romanoff’s writing has been translated into 32 languages and his articles posted on more than 150 foreign-language news and politics websites in more than 30 countries, as well as more than 100 English language platforms. Larry Romanoff is a retired management consultant and businessman. He has held senior executive positions in international consulting firms, and owned an international import-export business. He has been a visiting professor at Shanghai’s Fudan University, presenting case studies in international affairs to senior EMBA classes. Mr. Romanoff lives in Shanghai and is currently writing a series of ten books generally related to China and the West. He is one of the contributing authors to Cynthia McKinney’s new anthology ‘When China Sneezes’. (Chapt. 2 — Dealing with Demons).

    罗曼诺夫的著作已被翻译成32种语言,他的文章发表在30多个国家的150多个外语新闻和政治网站上,以及100多个英语平台上。拉里·罗曼诺夫是一名退休的管理顾问和商人。他曾在国际咨询公司担任高级管理职位,并拥有国际进出口业务。他曾在上海复旦大学担任客座教授,向EMBA高级班讲授国际事务方面的案例研究。罗曼诺夫住在上海,目前正在撰写一系列十本书,这些书通常与中国和西方有关。他是辛西娅·麦金尼的新集《当中国打喷嚏的时候》的撰稿人之一。(第二章——对付恶魔)。

    His full archive can be seen at

    他的完整文章库可在以下找到

    https://www.bluemoonofshanghai.com/ + https://www.moonofshanghai.com/

    He can be contacted at:

    联系方式如下:

    2186604556@qq.com

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    Notes

    注释

    [1] Helmut Schmidt: ‘I Would Not Sell Democracy To The Chinese’

    [1] 赫尔穆特·施密特:我不会把民主卖给中国人

    http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/01/china-democracy_n_5067120.html

    Copyright © Larry RomanoffBlue Moon of ShanghaiMoon of Shanghai, 2022

    版权所有(2022年)拉里·罗曼诺夫上海的蓝月亮上海之月